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X. JUSTIFIED BELIEF AND THE 
INFINITE REGRESS ARGUMENT 
JOHN N. WILLIAMS 
An 
infinite regress argument is often presented in 
order to force the alternatives of a foundation 
or a coherence account of justified belief. It is typically 
said that if S's belief that p is justified, then it is 
justified by S's justified beliefs of something other than 
p, e.g. that q. But since these latter beliefs must also be 
justified, an infinity of justified beliefs is required. 
Hence, unless one is to deny that justified belief is 
possible, one must either deny that the justification is 
serial, i.e., adopt a coherence account, or affirm that 
the justificatory series has a terminus, i.e., adopt a 
foundational account.2 
However, the question of whether the regress is 
vicious or virtuous has been neglected. With the 
possible exception of Pierce3 those who have presented 
the regress have merely assumed its viciousness. But 
if the regress is virtuous, neither a coherence nor a 
foundational account of justified belief need be 
adopted. 
I shall argue that the regress is vicious (i.e., would 
entail an impossibility) because it would entail the 
justified believer holding an infinite number of beliefs, 
which is impossible. Moreover, I shall criticise a rival 
view,4 that the viciousness of the regress accrues 
because it would entail the justified believer holding 
an infinitely complex belief. 
I. Infinitely Numerous Beliefs 
The regress in justification for 5"s belief that p 
would certainly entail that he holds an infinite 
number of beliefs. This is psychologically, if not 
logically, impossible. If a man can believe an infinite 
number of things, then there seems no reason why he 
cannot know an infinite number of things. Both 
possibilities contradict the common intuition that the 
human mind is finite. Only God could entertain an 
infinite number of beliefs. But surely God is not the 
only justified believer. 
It has been thought (ibid., p. 312) that one 
sometimes holds an infinite number of beliefs, when 
one believes the infinitely numerous entailments of 
what one indisputably believes. A possible source of 
this thought is the thesis that if S believes that/>, then 
S believes the entailments of p. This is mistaken. The 
proposition expressed by "This figure is equilateral" 
entails that expressed by "This figure is equiangular." 
But a man may believe that this figure is equilateral 
without believing that it is equiangular. He may 
understand the former proposition while either not 
understanding the latter, or not knowing that if this 
figure is equilateral then it is equiangular. 
Were one to believe the infinitely numerous 
entailments of what one indisputably believes then 
these beliefs would not be beliefs of which one is 
conscious. It is psychologically, if not logically, 
impossible to consciously entertain an infinite series. 
If one consciously believes that p, then one has 
considered whether p. One considers a proposition 
within datable temporal limits. It may be logically, 
but it is not humanly possible5 to perform an infinite 
number of tasks in a finite time. God may be able to 
simultaneously consider in a finite time an infinite 
number of propositions, but surely no one else can. 
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Admittedly, it is logically possible that one could take 
less time to consider whether p than to consider 
whether q, and less time still to consider whether r 
and so on ad infinitum. But surely it is contingently true 
that there is a minimum time in which a man can 
consider a proposition. Only God could consider 
whether p in a trillionth (or trillionth trillionth or 
...) of a second. 
Is it possible to unconsciously believe the infinitely 
numerous entailments of what one indisputably 
believes? 
A seemingly plausible example of this has recently 
been advanced6 : What I indisputably believe is that 
I am within one hundred miles of Boston. Moreover, 
I believe, albeit unconsciously, that I am within two 
hundred miles of Boston and believe unconsciously 
that I am within three hundred miles of Boston ... 
and ad infinitum. 
But now I must be able to understand what I 
believe, in each case. It would be ludicrous to attribute 
to someone beliefs of things of which he had never 
heard or of which he had no understanding. This, 
together with the comprehension of a normal dog 
explains why it is plausible to say of it that it believes 
that a cat is outside the house but implausible to say 
that it will be beaten every second Sunday in Lent. 
But in the series of propositions?I am within one 
hundred miles of Boston, I am within two hundred 
miles of Boston ... and ad infinitum, there are 
propositions so finitely complex that these defeat 
human understanding. At some point there will occur 
a proposition of the form?I am within n miles of 
Boston?in which 'n' represents a number so large 
that no one can consider it. While there is no point at 
which '?' is infinitely large, there will be a point 
where, e.g., even writing it down would not be a task 
achievable in a mortal lifetime. 
Consider another apparent example of uncon? 
sciously believing the infinitely numerous entailments 
of what one indisputably believes: I indisputably 
believe that/>. Moreover, I unconsciously believe that 
not not p, unconsciously believe that not not not not 
/>,... and ad infinitum. At no point in an infinite series 
of such propositions is the number of "nots" infinitely 
large. But surely there is a proposition wherein the 
number of "nots" is inconceivably large. This 
proposition is the first of those which no-one could 
consider, nor therefore, believe. Introducing an 
abbreviating notation (e.g., one expresses "not not^" 
as not 2p) leaves the situation unchanged, for there 
comes a point at which the abbreviating number itself 
becomes inconceivably large. 
One cannot hold an infinite number of beliefs, 
whether conscious or unconscious. 
II. The Requirements of Justified Belief 
An infinite regress in the justifications of belief is 
not vicious because it would entail the justified 
believer holding an infinitely complex belief. The 
regress would not entail this impossibility. 
What is believed is something which is possible to 
be considered and expressed. But what can neither be 
considered nor expressed is therefore what one cannot 
believe, and that which is infinitely complex is what 
can neither be considered nor expressed. Not even 
God could express what is infinitely complex, and a 
belief that not even God could express is surely no 
belief at all. Likewise if one believes that p, one 
understands the proposition p. If the proposition p is 
infinitely complex, then it is not humanly possible to 
understand nor therefore believe it. 
One must correctly identify the requirements of 
justified belief to see why the regress would not entail 
the justified believer holding an infinitely complex 
belief. What is required for S to be justified in 
believing that p is that ?justifiably believes something 
(e.g., that q) which justifies his belief that p. 
This threatens an infinite regress. S must justifiably 
believe each of what justifies his consequent beliefs, in 
order to be justified in believing that p. Each of a 
chain of premises may be something which adequately 
justifies a belief of the next, and ultimately of the 
conclusion. But surely S is unjustified in believing the 
conclusion if he fails to believe or is unjustified in 
believing any of the premises. Since the fact that q 
must be a justification of 6"s belief that p, and ?must 
justifiably believe that q for S to justifiably believe 
that/>, it is mistaken to identify what makes ^justified 
in believing that p, either with the fact that q, since it 
may not be the case that q, or merely with the 
justifiably held belief that q, since the fact that q may 
be no justification for believing that/*.7 
If S justifiably believes that p then he must be 
justified in believing something (e.g., that he has read 
in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica th&tp) which justifies his 
first belief. But it does not follow that S believes, or 
justifiably believes of what he is justified in believing 
(e.g., that q) and which justifies his belief that p, that 
it does justify his belief that p.8 Nor does it follow that 
6 Richard Foley, op. cit., pp. 311-312. 7 Cf. John Pollock, op. cit., p. 25. 8 Pace Richard Foley, op. cit., p. 313. 
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there is anything (which ?justifiably believes) which 
is ?'s justification i.e. a proposition which S does or 
could offer9 as a justification for believing that p, or 
which he has taken as evidence for this belief.10 
Although ?justifiably believes that he has read in 
the Encyclopaedia Brittanica that p, he may doubt or be 
unaware that he believes this. Similarly, he may be 
unaware that he believes that p. In either case S 
cannot offer his reading of the encyclopaedia as a 
justification for believing that p, nor need he believe 
that reading what he has in the encyclopedia justifies 
believing that p. 
Suppose that S is aware both that he believes that 
p and that he believes that he has read that p in the 
Encyclopedia Brittanica. Nonetheless S may fail to 
believe that his reading justifies believing that/* either 
because he doubts that reading something in the 
encyclopedia justifies believing it (he doubts the 
encyclopedia's reliability) or because he doubts that 
he is justified in believing that he has read in the 
Encyclopedia Brittanica that p. 
Nonetheless, S may justifiably believe that he has 
read in the encyclopedia that p, where reading that p 
in the Encyclopedia Brittanica justifies believing that p. 
S may even offer his reading as a justification for 
believing that p, while doubting or not believing that 
what he offers as a justification does justify his belief, 
and be informed by someone more cognizant of the 
Encyclopaedia's reliability, that it does. 
Since S need not believe of what he is justified in 
believing (that q) and which justifies believing that/*, 
that it does justify believing that p, in order to 
justifiably believe that p, S need not believe that if q 
then/* in order to be justified in believing that/* even 
if his justification for believing that^ is that q.n 
The requirements of justified belief parallel those 
of justified action. What is required for ?'s action to 
be justified is that ? is justified in believing that 
something is so, where its being so justifies this action. 
If ?justifiably believes that the pitch is waterlogged 
and its being waterlogged justifies cancelling the 
match then ?isjustified in cancelling the match. But 
since ? may be justified in believing that the pitch is 
waterlogged without being aware that he believes 
this, the waterlogged state of the pitch need not be his 
justification, i.e., something which ? does or can offer 
as a justification. 
S may doubt or not believe that the waterlogged 
state of the pitch justifies cancelling the match, either 
because he doubts that he is justified in believing that 
the pitch is waterlogged, or because he doubts that 
the waterlogged state of the pitch is enough to justify 
cancelling the match. Nonetheless, it may be the case 
both that for the pitch to be waterlogged is enough to 
justify cancelling the match, and that ?justifiably 
believes that the pitch is waterlogged. A more 
knowledgable player may inform ?that waterlogging 
justifies cancellation. 
Just as what one offers or could offer as a 
justification for an action or belief need not be 
anything which justifies it, so conversely, what justifies 
an action or belief need not be anything which one 
offers or could offer as a justification. 
A regress in justification would not entail the 
justified believer holding an infinitely complex belief. 
If ?is justified in believing that/* by virtue of believing 
that q, and justified in believing that q by virtue of 
believing that r and so on then he must be justified in 
believing each member of the series and each member 
must be something which justifies believing the next. 
Only if ? were required to believe of each member 
that it justifies believing the next, would he be 
required to hold an infinitely complex belief. For 
then he would have to believe that believing that /* is 
justified by q, the believing of which is justified by r, 
the believing of which ... and so on ad infinitum. But 
since ?is not required to believe of each member that 
it justifies believing the next, he is not required to 
hold a belief of infinite complexity. 
III. Infinitely Complex Beliefs 
If the regress were to entail the justified believer 
holding an infinitely complex belief it would thereby 
entail his holding an infinite number of beliefs, which 
is impossible. Hence it is mistaken to identify the 
viciousness of the regress with its entailing an 
infinitely complex belief in preference to identifying 
the viciousness with its entailing an infinite number 
of beliefs.12 
A belief may be infinitely complex in two ways. 
First, per impossible, S believes that p and that q and 
that r... ad infinitum. Here the infinite complexity lies 
in the infinite number of terms. Second, suppose that 
9 Pace John Pollock, op. cit. ; cf. L. Bonjour, op. cit., p. 2. 10 Pace N. M. L. Nathan, op. cit., p. 117. 11 Pace the allied view shared by A. Phillips-Griffiths and D. McQueen "Belief and Reasons for Belief," Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Vol. XLVII (1973), pp. 53-86. 12 Pace Richard Foley, op. cit., p. 313. 
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? first holds the belief that if/* then q, and then holds 
the belief that if; if/* then q, and /*, then q. He would 
hold an infinitely complex belief if per impossible he 
then held an infinitely expanded belief i.e., that if if 
if... ad infinitum. Here the infinite complexity lies in 
the infinite number of relations between terms. 
If ?holds a belief which is infinitely complex in this 
first way, then he holds an infinite number of beliefs, 
since believing a conjunction entails holding a 
conjunction of beliefs. A man who did not believe 
that /* could not believe that /* and q (and mutatis 
mutandis for the belief that q). Hence, if ?believes that 
/* and that q and that r ... and ad infinitum, then he 
believes that p and believes that q and believes that r 
... and ad infinitum. 
If ?"holds a belief which is infinitely complex in the 
second way, then he still has an infinite number of 
beliefs. A man who did not believe that if/* then q 
could not be correctly said to believe that if; if/* then 
q, and /*, then q. A man who believes of an infinite 
number of relations that they hold between terms 
must believe of each relation, that it holds. 
The reductio force of the regress accrues because it 
would entail the justified believer holding an infinite 
number of beliefs, and not because it would entail 
him holding an infinitely complex belief. 
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